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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from a final order of the District Court 
in and for Utah County, awarding Plaintiff/Respondent a money 
judgment against Defendant/Appellant. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial Court, the Honorable J. Robert Bullock pre-
siding without a jury, found for the plaintiff/respondent in that 
defendant/appellant was liable to the plaintiff/respondent in the 
sum of $2,332076 on the basis of an open accounta 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant/Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment 
of the lower Court. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff/Respondent, City Electric, a Utah corpora-
tion, hereinafter referred to as "plaintiff", initiated an ac-
tion in the Fourth Judicial District in and for Utah County, 
seeking to recover a money judgment against Dean Evans Chrysler 
Plymouth, Inc., appellant/defendant, hereinafter referred to as 
"defendant", for electrical materials (the "materials"). 
Plaintiff delivered the materials to a construction 
remodeling site located in Provo, Utah. Plaintiff has a store 
in Orem, Utah, and at all times pertinent herein a Mr. Stewart 
Donald Hatch was the local manager at Orem, Utah. 
Between the periods of October and December, 1978, plain-
tiff delivered upon a construction remodeling site known as 
"Johnny Rider's Backstage Restaurant" (the "construction site"), 
located at Provo, Utah, and/or sold certain electrical supplies 
and materials to be used upon the construction site, from plain-
tiff's own Orem store. 
Plaintiff in selling and/or delivering the materials 
treated the same as an open account and charged the value of the 
same to a credit account of the corporate defendant. 
The corporate defendant, at all times pertinent herein, 
was a duly authorized corporation and during the period of 1/12/78 
to 3/12/79, M. D. Evans (Mike Evans) was an Assistant Secretary of 
the corporate defendant (see Exhibit P-1, Annual Report of Organi-
zation). 
-2-
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Plaintiff, unilaterally, decided to treat the purchase 
of the materials as an open account item and charged defendant's 
own credit account at plaintiff's premises. 
After the sale and delivery of the materials and when 
payment was not received by plaintiff, plaintiff initiated this 
action seeking to recover judgment against defendant. 
Other than the maintenance of an account by defendant 
at the plaintiff's place of business, there was no written or 
oral agreement between plaintiff and defendant for the payment 
of the materials upon which recovery is sought. 
For purposes of correcting the record and clarity in 
the Transcript of Trial (the "Transcript" or "Tr.") the word 
"written" should be substituted for the word "recent" which pres-
ently appears on p. 16, line 6, and the words "written or oral" 
should be substituted for the words "recent oral" as it presently 
appears on p. 44, line 3e 
The construction site upon which the materials were 
used is not owned by nor is it connected with the business of 
the defendant. 
The materials sold by plaintiff did not go to the de-
fendant corporation nor did defendant corporation benefit from 
the merchandisee 
-3-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S ACTS DID NOT CONSTI-
TUTE AN ORIGINAL PROMISE TO PAY 
FOR THE DELIVERY OF THE ELECTRI-
CAL GOODS BY PLAINTIFF, AND PLAIN-
TIFF IS BARRED FROM RECOVERY BY 
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS, §25-5-4(2) 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED. 
The basic issue presented in this case is whether or 
not there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the 
finding of the trial Court that defendant's acts in dealing with 
the plaintiff constituted an original promise to pay for the de-
livery of the electrical goods, made between October and Decem-
ber, 1978, upon a construction site known as "Johnny Rider's 
Backstage Restaurant" in Provo, Utah. 
The record amply shows that there was not a written or 
oral agreement between the parties for the payment of goods de-
livered by plaintiff. Plaintiff, at the trial has attempted 
through circumstantial evidence to show that there was an implied 
agreement, in the form of an original promise to pay, by virtue 
of the two Exhibits admitted into Court. An examination however 
of the Exhibits and the testimony of plaintiff's witnesses, show 
that plaintiff failed in its burden of proof to prove that an 
original undertaking on the part of the defendant existed. 
-4-
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The only witness that could possibly connect the de-
fendant with the plaintiff and the subsequent delivery of goods 
by plaintiff to the restaurant is a person by the name of Donald 
R. Sturgill. A review of Mr. Sturgill's testimony shows that, 
during October, 1978, he was employed by the defendant as a car 
salesman reporting directly to the sales manager {Tr. p. 8, lines 
5-6). His prior employment had also consisted· of acting as an 
outside salesman for the plaintiff o 
Upon learning that a Mr. Rider and Mike Evans were in-
terested in remodeling their restaurant he volunteered to assist 
them in obtaining " ..... a good price on what they needed" for 
the.electrical supplies in such remodeling (Tr. p. 9, lines 14 
17)G Mr. Sturgill also informed the manager of the plaintiff at 
the time that the materials sought :·.to be purchased from the plain-
tiff were to be used in connection with the restaurant. {Tr. p. 9, 
lines 28 - 30, to po 10, line l)e Specifically, in answer to plain-
tiff's question Mro Sturgill stated that he did not instruct City 
Electric to charge merchandise to the plaintiff's account but 
stated: "By no means did I instruct. I requested and asked whether 
they [Johny Rider and Mike Evans] could establish an account "Tr. 
p. 10, lines 5 - 6). 
Viewing Mr. Sturgill's testimony consisting of three 
and a half pages in the record {Tr. p. 7 line 1 top. 10, line 12) 
-5-
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in the light most favorable to plaintiff, no evidence whatsoever 
was produced that can even be remotely construed as a promise by 
defendant to pay for the materials which plaintiff delivered to 
the restaurant site. 
As a matter of fact the only inference that can be made 
from Mr. Sturgill's testimony is that Mr. Rider and Mr. Evans, 
individually, in their efforts to remodel their restaurant, sought, 
the help of Mr. Sturgill, as a former employee of the plaintiff, 
to ascertain prices and open an account for their own credit with 
the plaintiff (Tr. p. 9, lines 14 - 20). Therefore, the credit 
extended by plaintiff was given to the individuals and not the de-
fendant. 
It is plainly clear that there is no evidence in the 
record whereby Finding of Fact No. 6 to wit, 
"6. Mike Evans instructed that the purchases were to 
be charged to defendant's account with plaintiff" 
can be sustained. 
Only from the testimony of Mr. Sturgill could one pos-
sibly extract such an inference; however, upon reviewing the same 
(Tr. p. 7 to p. 10) no such inference can be made. The substance 
of Mr. Sturgill's testimony is that he had a telephone conversa-
tion with plaintiff's agent inquiring as to prices. When speci-
fically asked about whether or not he instructed anyone as to the 
charging of merchandise to the defendant's account, he replied: 
-6-
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By no means did I instruct. I requested and asked 
whether they could establish an account. 
(Tr. p. 10, lines 5 - 6; emphasis added). 
Since defendant had already an account open with plaintiff it 
would not be necessary for Mr. Sturgill to ask on behalf of de-
fendant. It is obvious from the testimony as shown on page 9 of 
the transcript that it was " 
. Mike and Johnny were involved 
in the restaurant and that they would be purchasing materials." 
(Tro p. 9, lines 29 - 30, emphasis added), and not the defendant; 
plaintiff was fully aware of that fact at the time it sold the 
materials .. 
It is respectfully submitted that in order to arrive at 
the finding, as suggested by the trial court, that defendant be-
came liable as a promissor, for an original promise to pay, plain-
tiff had to produce some modicum of evidence either express or 
implied showing the intent of the defendant to be bound to pay 
for the materials. For instance plaintiff failed to prove that 
the defendant corporation promised to pay after the materials were 
delivered; or, that, the defendant corporation acting through any 
of its authorized representations impliedly, promised to pay be-
cause it had any direct or indirect pecuniary interest in the 
transaction; or that there was a promise by defendant corporation 
to pay; or, that the furnishing of the materials was for the bene-
fit of the defendanto 
-7-
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It is clear that plaintiff failed in its burden of 
proof to show any remote connection between the corporate defen-
dant and the furnishing of materials by plaintiff for the remodel-
ing of a restaurant owned by Ride.r and Evans. 
Part of Finding of Fact #14, to-wit: 
14 . These invoices [October 8, 1978 and October 
9, 1978] were paid in December by defendant. 
cannot be sustained by the evidence. There is no reference 
whatsoever_ in the record that defendant corporation paid for the 
items and invoices recited therein. The only evidence in the re-
cord is that those two invoces were paid, however, no testimony 
or other documentary evidence exists to show if the defendant 
corporation paid the two invoices dated October 8 and October 9, 
1978. (Tr. p. 12, lines 28 - 30; p. 13, lines 1 - 24). Plaintiff 
is merely bootstrapping his case on the theory that if payment 
was made, it was made by the defendant; however the inference 
should be made that Johnny Rider and/or Mike Evans paid for the 
items charged on those dates, and in view of Mr. Sturgill's testi-
mony relating who wanted the construction done (Tr. p. 8, lines 
19 - 30; p. 9, lines 12 - 20); ••. it is the only permissible 
inference. 
The trial court erred in its finding that it was the 
intent of the parties that the corporate defendant would pay for 
the materials delivered by plaintiff on the construction site. 
-8-
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The circumstances and facts of the case as presented by plain-
tiff fail to show the intent of the defendant to pay for mater-
ials ordered by third parties .. The record is devoid of any evi-
dence, express or implied, where an inference can be made that 
the credit by plaintiff was extended to defendant. There were 
no words, oral or written, used by defendant in making a "promise" 
to pay for the materials delivered by defendant. There is no 
evidence that the plaintiff was induced by defendant to deliver 
the materials to the construction site, nor that the goods were 
furnished by defendant relying upon the credit or the request of 
the defendant. 
In Sugar v. Miller, 6 U 2d 433, 315 P 2d 862 (1957) 
this Court found that there was an original promise to pay for 
the delivery of services by the defendant, by examining the cir-
cumstances and the intent of the parties, in determining liabil-
ity.. In the Sugar case, there were express representations and 
inducements and furthermore, the defendant in that case was ex-
tending the credit only upon those representationso 
In the instant case a review of the records clearly 
shows an absence of any evidence, from which an inference can 
be made as to the liability of the defendanto 
The best that can be said for plaintiff's case is 
that, defendant had an open account with the plaintiff, and 
that defendant delivered materials valued at $2,332e76 upon a 
remodeling site known as "Johnny Rider's Backstage Restaurant", 
and that there was no record of a written objection by the cor-
porate defendant regarding the invoices sued upon, and that the 
_Q_ 
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prices charged on the invoices were "fair" or that the purchaser 
was treated fairly. 
It appears from the record that the plaintiff was ac-
tually relying upon the credit of Mr. Sturgill rather than the 
corporate defendant because Mr. Hatch, plaintiff's store mana-
ger, in answer to plaintiff's counsel's questions stated: 
Q. And so, in other words, you were giving a more 
favorable price to this account that you otherwise 
would to this type of customer? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Why did you do that? 
A. Well, I knew Dave Sturgill, and he had been a friend 
of mine, and he asked me to do him a favor. 
(Tr. P. 34, lines 3 - 9). 
It is also clear that plaintiff knew at the time that 
Mr. Sturgill was not an authorized representative or agent of 
the defendant. Mr. Hatch testified as follows: 
Q. Mr. Hatch, you said Mr. Sturgill was a friend of yours? 
A. Yes, an acquaintance, a friend, yes. 
Q. You knew he was working for Dean Evans Chrysler-Plymouth, 
Inc.? 
A. I knew he was, did you say? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Yes, I knew he was. 
-10-
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Q. Did you know what capacity he was working in? 
A. He was a car salesman. 
Q. You knew that he did not have any managerial capacity 
in that dealership, did you not? 
Ae I did not know that, but I assumed he did not. 
Q. All righto During this period of time that you and 
he had a conversation, you assumed that he did not have 
any managerial capacity? 
A. True. 
Q. Is that correct? 
A.. Yes. 
(Tr. p. 36, lines 1 - 19). 
Mr. Hatch's further testimony showed clearly and unequiv-
ocally that plaintiff knew at the time of the ordering of the mater-
ials for whom the materials were intended~ 
Q. You were aware of the delivery of the remodeling 
project of the Backstage Restaurant? 
A., I was. 
Q. Mro Sturgill told you that? 
A. Yes. 
(Tre P. 37, line 25 - 29). 
In conclusion in reviewing the record of the testimony 
of the witnesses and the documentary evidence there is not a 
preponderance of evidence supporting the finding of liability by 
the Court against the corporate defendant. 
-11-
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It is respectfully submitted that plaintiff's claims 
against the corporate defendant are barred by the provisions of 
the Statute of Frauds, §25-5-4(2), wherein it is stated that: 
In the following cases every agreement shall be void 
unless such agreement or some note or memorandum 
thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party to be 
charged therewith: 
(2) Every promise to answer for the debt, default or 
miscarriage of another. 
A review of the record clearly indicates that it was 
not the intent of the parties that the defendant should be liable 
for charges made to its account with the plaintiff by third parties. 
Plaintiff has failed in its burden of proof in showing by prepond-
erance of evidence, that the requisite elements of intent existed 
in order to charge the defendant with liability. 
POINT II 
THERE WAS NO APPARENT AUTHORITY 
FOR DEFENDANT'S ACCOUNT TO BE 
USED BY THIRD PARTIES, NOR RATI-
FICATION OR ACCEPTANCE OF THE 
CHARGES MADE THEREIN. 
The fundamental rule relating to apparent or ostensible 
authority of an officer of a corporation is that the corporation 
is bound by the acts of an officer if he acts in the usual course 
-12-
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of the business of the corporation in such a way as to justify to 
third persons who deal with him in inferring or assuming that he 
is doing an act or making a contract within the scope of his au-
thority. However, apparent or ostensible authority is . 
"limited and governed by the character of business in which the 
corporation is engaged"o 19 Am Jur 2d, §1164, p. 591. 
The facts of the instant case clearly disclose that 
at the time plaintiff sold and delivered the electrical supplies 
and materials to the restaurant construction site, plaintiff knew 
that defendant corporation was engaged in the business of selling 
automobiles. Plaintiff knew that the materials were to be used 
for the remodeling of a restaurant (Tr. p. 37, lines 25 - 30), 
and there is no evidence in the record that there was any connec-
tion between the restaurant remodeling and the corporate defen-
dant. As a matter of fact, the contrary clearly appears in the 
record from the evidence of plaintiff's first witness (Mr. Stur-
gill) when in response to plaintiff's counsel's questions he re-
plied that Johnny Rider and Mike Evans were remodeling "their" 
restaurant and needed electrical supplies and furthermore, he, 
Mr. Sturgill, specifically related to Don Hatch the following: 
A. I had talked to Don and told him who the restaurant 
was for, yes. I told him that Mike and Johny were involved 
in the restaurant and that they would be purchasing rnaterialse 
(Tr. P. 9, lines 28 - 30, p. 10, line 1). 
~12-
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For defendant to assert at the time of the trial (Tr. 
p. 51, lines 12 - 25) that it relied upon~the corporate defendant 
to get paid is an argument contrary to the plaintiff's own elici-
tation of the facts. 
It is clear that the trial court totally misinterpreted 
the law of apparent or ostensible authority in analyzing the facts 
before it and those findings of fact are not supported by any 
evidence whatsoever in the record. Plaintiff simply knew from 
the beginning, around October 1978, who was going to get the mater-
ials and who was going to pay for them. The only witness upon 
which plaintiff relies to make its case of apparent or ostensible 
authority (Mr. Surgill), clearly and unequivocally told plaintiff's 
manager, Mr. Hatch, who was ordering and who was going to use the 
materials. From the testimony of the record no other inference 
can be made as no shred of evidence, let alone a preponderance of 
evidence, exists to make the defendant corporation liable for 
the debts of a third party. 
Mr. Batch's testimony certainly did not produce any 
evidence showing that the plaintiff had any express or implied 
authorization by the defendant to charge defendant's account with 
the purchases. Mr. Batch's testimony on that point, is that he 
looked up the " •.• computer print-out for addresses and open 
accounts " . . . , found one for the corporate defendant, and he, 
himself, unilaterally, decided to charge defendant's account. 
(Tr. p. 38, lines 23 - 30). 
-13-
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The record cannot sustain Finding No. 13 to-wit, 
13 Plaintiff relied upoii defendant's credit with 
plaintiff in selling material and granting the 
more favorable price. 
in that neither Mr. Middlestead, nor Mr. Hatch, plaintiff's 
agent ever asserted or implied that they relied upon the credit 
of the defendant in selling the materials. Any such inference 
by the Court is reversible error. 
The case for the "reliance upon the credit of defendant" 
and upon the "apparent authority" theories of plaintiff's case is 
attempted to be reached through a circuitous route commencing with 
a telephone conversation which plaintiff's agent Don Hatch had 
with a former employee of plaintiff (Sturgill), who at the time 
was a salesman for defendant, who (Sturgill) had a conversation 
with Mike Evans, who told him that they (Rider and Evans) wanted 
to obtain fair prices for electrical materialse As a matter of 
fact, defendant's counsel's motion to strike the conversation 
between Mr. Hatch and Mr~ Sturgill, having been made and renewed, 
was overruled by the court. (Tr. pe 29, lines 23 - 30; Tr. p. 30, 
lines 13 - 22; Tro p. 36, lines 20 - 23; Tr. p. 37 lines 1 - 7). 
It is respectfully submitted that any evidence of the telephone 
conversation between Mr. Sturgill and Mre Hatch should have been 
excluded, and the failure of the trial to do so, is reversible 
error; in any event it certainly does not factually support the 
findings made by the trial Court. 
-14-
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant submits that the lower Court erred in all 
material respects in finding for the plaintiff an assessing 
liability against the defendant, and that this Court should 
enter its order reversing the judgment of the trial Court and 
dismissing plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice. 
Re~ec:fully submitted, 
u~ 
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Served three (3) copies of the foregoing brief to 
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